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Tang: Copyright in the Expanded Field

COPYRIGHT IN THE EXPANDED FIELD'
Xiyin Tang*
Intellectual property ("IP") law and the art forms it is meant to
protect are expanding. In our information age, artists hoping to assert
their rightsfrequently assert a combination of trademark,copyright, and
right of publicity or moral rights claims in order to maximize their
chances of success. This Article looks beyond IP law to some of its more
unlikely complements-tort and property law-as a viable means of
redress for artists who may be ineligible for copyright protection.
Specifically, recent cases involving a specific form of hybrid art-land
art, or "site specific art"-have determinedly stripped artists of either
their moral rights or copyright claims. Thus, I suggest looking to the
laws of trespass and nuisance as new ways of thinking about the same
problem: How do we balance public rights in our shared artworks with
private rights of control? Surprisingly, this Article suggests that
applying nuisance law's balancing test has much in common with the
four-factor balancing test of copyright'sfair use doctrine. On a greater
level, this Article hopes to encourage the ongoing trend of creative ways
of thinking about and asserting artisticrights when traditionalcopyright
claims may not befeasible or successful.

1. This Article takes its name from the 1978 essay by Rosalind Krauss titled Sculpture in the
Expanded Field, which perfectly documents the phenomenon of post-1960s artists working in an
expanded medium that encompasses elements of architecture, landscape, nature, and traditional
sculpture. Rosalind Krauss, Sculpture in the Expanded Field,OCTOBER, Spring 1979, at 31.
* Visiting Fellow, Yale Law School, Yale Information Society Project; Associate, Skadden,
Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom New York; J.D., Yale Law School; B.A., Columbia University.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

It is about fifteen hundred feet in length and fifteen feet wide, built
from 6650 tons of basalt rocks and earth.2 It sits just south of Rozel
Point, in Utah's Salt Lake, next to swirls of black oil from abandoned
rigs. Thousands of people make the pilgrimage each year to see it, and
they are photographed from above, standing like tiny ants atop the salt,
as if minute stars dotting a constellation. For the rest of us, we see it only
through photographs, almost always aerial views, in which the swirl cuts
across its site like "a strange footprint on the shores of the unknown."3
As it turns out, "even the artist is startled to discover that this 'footprint
is our own.' 4
Is it architecture? Is it a larger-than-life sculpture? Is it nature? Is it
a man-made imitation of the former? Is it a site? Is it life itself?.
It is, of course, Robert Smithson's Spiral Jetty ("Spiral Jetty" or
"Jetty"), an iconic earthwork or piece of "land art" that has, since its
creation, been the stuff of art historical myth and fable-not least of
which was its submersion under water at the same time that Smithson
died in a fatal plane crash, creating a sort of double negative or
2. Lynne Cooke, A Position of Elsewhere, in ROBERT SMITHSON: SPIRAL JETTY 53, 53
(Lynne Cooke et al. eds., 2005).
3. Ann Reynolds, At the Jetty, in ROBERT SMITHSON: SPIRAL JETTY, supra note 2, at 73, 73.
4. Id.
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disappearance. 5 While the Jetty is perhaps the most famous earthwork, it
is not alone. Walter de Maria's Lightning Field in New Mexico, Michael
Heizer's Effigy Tumuli in Illinois, and James Turrell's Roden Crater in
Arizona are just a few of the many examples of artists working in
expanded mediums that implicate site, architecture, sculpture, and
nature-as-material.
Copyright law, on the other hand, only extends protection to eight
categories of works: literary works, musical works, dramatic works,
choreographic works, pictorial/graphic/sculptural works, motion
pictures, sound recordings, and architectural works.6 Numerous legal
scholars have already noted that evolving forms of art-not just
appropriation art (for which fair use remains a field ripe with
possibilities and problems), 7 but conceptual art, performance art, and
temporal "happenings," which are notable for their ephemerality8 -seem
incompatible and fundamentally unprotectable under the very laws
intended for their protection. Land art, specifically, does not neatly fit
into any of the above-named categories.
Few solutions outside of legislative reform have been posed, 9 yet
the fast-changing nature of art likely renders legislative reform
impractical, and would leave new legislation largely obsolete in
its wake. What is needed, then, are creative solutions within
already-existing law-solutions that may lie outside of the copyright
statute itself. Artists asserting copyright claims already frequently assert
trademark and right of personality claims as well, suggesting an
awareness that personhood, branding, and artistic creation are all

5. Cooke, supra note 2, at 53; see also Michael Kimmelman, Sculpturefrom the Earth, but
Never Limited by It, N.Y. TIMEs, June 24, 2005, at E33.
6. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
7. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski & Christopher Newman, What's So FairAbout FairUse?, 46 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S. 513, 525 (1999); Gideon Parchomovsky & Philip J. Weiser, Beyond Fair
Use, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 91, 100-01 (2010); Xiyin Tang, That Old Thing,
Copyright... : Reconciling the Postmodern Paradox in the New Digital Age, 39 AIPLA Q.J. 71,
86-94 (2011).
8. See, e.g., Randall Bezanson & Andrew Finkelman, Trespassory Art, 43 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 245,246 (2010); Charles Cronin, Dead on the Vine: Living and ConceptualArt and VARA,
12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 209,221-22 (2010).
9. See Virginia M. Cascio, Hardly a Walk in the Park: Courts' Hostile Treatment of SiteSpecific Works Under VARA, 20 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 167, 168-69 (2009);
Lauren Ruth Spotts, Phillips Has Left VARA Little Protectionfor Site-Specific Artists, 16 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 297,298-99 (2009); see also Bryan J. Hopping, A Proposalfor the WTO to Enhance Moral
Rights Protections, GONZ. J. INT'L L. (June 4, 2008), http://www.law.gonzaga.edu/gjil/
2008/06/enhance-moral-rights. However, Randall Bezanson and Andrew Finkelman have applied
real property principles to "trespassory" art (art that involves trespassing in spaces)-including
endowing artists with a limited "easement" to use private property for artist purposes. See Bezanson
& Finkelman, supra note 8, at 277-79.
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interlinked.1 ° But as evolving forms of art begin to look less comfortably
like traditional artworks, perhaps it would do us well to expand our
thinking beyond IP law, as well. This is where focusing on the specific
problem of land art--or earthworks-can prove instructive in
demonstrating that copyright need not be the only answer to the
exasperating problem of a copyright doctrine hostile to
contemporary art.
Art historian Rosalind Krauss has traced the art historical suspicion
for the new hybridity of sculpture to "the modernist demand for the
purity and separateness of the various mediums.""1 While land art may
seem "rigorously logical" from "within the situation of postmodernism,"
where "practice is not defined in relation to a given mediumsculpture-but rather in relation to the logical operations on a set of
cultural terms, for which any medium-photography, books, lines on
walls, mirrors, or sculpture itself-might be used,"' 2 contemporary
copyright law still remains very much focused and, might I add,
dependent on a very specific notion of modernist medium purity,
autonomy, and specificity. Indeed, throughout the history of copyright
law, judges have engaged in exactly the kind of modernist definitional
line-drawing that attempts to reduce, via a single set of finite, discrete
criteria, a specific medium to its "inherent" end logic.' 3 Thus, if legal
scholarship from the past decade has insisted on copyright's outdated
reliance on the notion of the nineteenth century romantic author, 14 I
argue instead that it is precisely the twentieth century avant-garde that
copyright law owes its debt to in its insistence on the purity of the
medium itself.
Further, land art proves to be a timely and especially interesting
case study for our purposes, as two recent circuit court decisions have
essentially deemed this hybrid art form unprotectable--either under
copyright law or its newer moral rights component, the Visual Artists

10. See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn
from Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1164-65 (2006); Xiyin Tang, The Artist as Brand:
Toward a Trademark Conception of Moral Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 218, 234-35 (2012) [hereinafter
Tang, The Artist as Brand].
11. ROSALIND E. KRAUSS, THE ORIGINALITY OF THE AVANT-GARDE AND OTHER MODERNIST
MYTHS 288 (1985).
12. Id.
13. See infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
14. Authors have argued that authorship is a socially-constructed category reliant on the
Romantic notion of an inspired genius. See, e.g., Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The
Metamorphoses of "Authorship," 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 459, 492, 494; Martha woodmansee, The
Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of the 'Author,' 17
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425, 429-30 (1984).
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Rights Act of 1990 ("VARA" or "Act"). 15 I focus Part II of this Article
on these two decisions and their implications for earthworks. 16 Part III
then links these legal opinions to a surprising predecessor: the twentieth
century avant-garde insistence on medium purity, not the nineteenth
century romantic author construct that most legal scholars have focused
on in their analysis of copyright doctrine's limitations.' 7 Applying this
reasoning, I come, in Part IV, to the seemingly disappointing conclusion
that this new form of hybrid art is, logically, uncopyrightable. 8 Yet, I
propose two new forms of protection under real property and tort lawspecifically, the claims of trespass and nuisance-which seem to most
aptly reflect land art's site-specific aspirations.' 9 Above all, I suggest
that we may think of legal protection for artworks not as an either-or
(either it is uncopyrightable and hence unprotectable or vice versa), but
as existing in an expanded field that encompasses other viable options
for redress, like real property or tort law.20
II.

THE LEGAL DILEMMA OF NON-TRADITIONAL ART

A.

FORMS

Copyright Basics

There are a few funny requirements of copyright law that will
form the chief concerns of this Article and its case law analysis. I will
review them each briefly in this Subpart, but they can be summed up
into three major themes: fixation, the idea-expression dichotomy, and
medium categorization.
The first two are relatively straightforward. One of the most basic
requirements for copyright protection is that an "original work[] of
authorship [be] fixed in any tangible medium.",21 The fixation-in-atangible-medium requirement interacts with, and informs, the other
major requirement of copyright law: that only expression, not ideas, can
be copyrighted.2 2 After all, if an idea is abstract then expression is
concrete, manifesting itself in something physical and tangible. Indeed,
15. The two cases are Kelley v. Chi. ParkDist., 635 F.3d 290, 298, 300 (7th Cir. 2011) and
Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 140, 143 (1st Cir. 2006).
16. See infra Part H.
17. See infra PartIi.
18. See infra Part IV.
19. See infra Part TV.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
22. Id. ("In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any
idea, procedure, process, system... concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.").
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the two requirements are frequently discussed together by courts when
examining whether a work satisfies these most basic of requirements.23
But, of course, the two present their own, unique problems. Even
presuming that an "idea" was "expressed" in a concrete way
(in a performance, for example), if there is no tangible record of it
(in a recording, for example), that expression would not be
copyrightable, either.24
The third major concern of this Article is a surprising one, for the
very word "medium" seems to be more of an art historical preoccupation
than a legal one. For modernism, which reached its apex in the 1960s
with the stronghold of art critics such as Clement Greenberg, medium
specificity was an imperative that drove critics to attempt to distill just
what made a painting a painting, a sculpture a sculpture, a photograph a
photograph, and art art. Greenberg, the king of modernist art critics,
penned his most famous work on medium specificity, Modernist
Painting, in which he defines what painting is-a purely visual
experience that is first and foremost flat, rendered so by the flatness of
its pictorial surface.25
Yet copyright, too, relies on assumptions about the inherent
characteristics of a specific medium, even if such assumptions are
implicit rather than explicit. For example, in deciding that an object that
has utilitarian concerns simply cannot qualify for copyright protection,26
courts are doing more than adhering to the letter of the law, which states
that useful articles belong to the realm of patents 27-they are saying that
artworks, like Greenberg's flat picture plane, should be inherently
useless, and the more useless they are, the more likely it will be that they
are eligible for copyright. Some might object, then again, that this leaves
us merely with a distinction between copyrightable artworks and
noncopyrightable non-art, without necessarily defining mediums within
the copyright statute.

23. See Dollcraft Indus., Ltd. v. Well-Made Toy Mfg. Co., 479 F. Supp. 1105, 1113
(E.D.N.Y. 1978) ("[C]opyright law protects an individual's concrete expression of his own idea.").
24. See, e.g., Hoopla Sports & Entm't, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 347, 354 (N.D. Ill.
1996) (noting that even if a basketball game is copyrightable, the fact that it was not recorded
renders it ineligible for copyright).
25. 4 CLEMENT GREENBERG, Modernist Painting, in THE COLLECTED ESSAYS AND
CRITICISM: MODERNISM WITH A VENGEANCE, at 85, 86 (John O'Brian ed., 1993).
26. Consider the famous case of Brandir Intl', Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., in which the
court had to decide whether a bike rack was sufficiently artistic to be considered sculpture, or if it
was influenced by utilitarian concerns and, thus, is considered a product of industrial design. 834
F.2d 1142, 1143 (2d Cir. 1987).
27. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
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Yet land art, in traversing the boundaries of sculpture, architecture,
land, or site, brashly confronts judges with the problem of medium
definition within the copyright statute. Even more importantly, consider
VARA, which gives the author of a painting, drawing, print, sculpture,
or photograph that exist in two hundred copies or less the right to
prevent the destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other modification of a
work that would be prejudicial to the author's reputation.28 A work
labeled "architecture" instead of "sculpture," then, would not be eligible
for VARA protection. Judges could either decide, for example, that land
art is more like "architecture" and hence not subject to VARA, or that it
is not art at all.
As we will see below, the few courts that have confronted the issue
of land art have also implicitly confronted the issue of medium
specificity-what a medium is, what it should be, what it contains, what
it does. But their failure to acknowledge the very assumptions they made
about mediums has led to much confusion, and, as others have pointed
out, poor case law. 29 For, as it turns out, the two courts that have most
notoriously opined on land art have done so from a highly modernistinflected view of sculpture: that sculptural works should be man-made,
static and unchanging, and, above all, that these self-contained
monuments should sit on pedestals within the white walls
of museums. 3°
B.

Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc.: StrippingLand Art of
VARA Protection

Earthworks do not fit comfortably into the self-contained, walled-in
ethos of the museum and its pedestals. Minimalism, with its emphasis on
atmosphere and environment, was the natural predecessor of these largescale, site-specific works that cannot be easily divorced from their
surroundings. In a problematic case for this new hybrid sculpture, the
court created a judicially-imposed VARA carve-out for site-specific art,
holding that VARA's "integrity" right (the right to prevent modifications
and mutilations of the artwork) did not apply to removals of site-specific
art from its, well, site.3 ' In Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc.,32 the
work in question was one by an artist named David Phillips, who
28. Id. §§ 101, 106(A).
29. See, e.g., Cascio, supra note 9, at 184-85; Rachel E. Nordby, Offof the Pedestaland into
the Fire: How Phillips Chips Away at the Rights of Site-Specific Artists, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 167,
186 (2007).
30. See Cascio, supranote 9, at 184-87; Nordby, supra note 29, at 184-85.
31. Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 140 (lst Cir. 2006).
32. 459 F.3d 128 (lst Cir. 2006).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2014

7

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 7

952

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 42:945

designed a series of stoneworks for Boston's Eastport Park.33 These
sculptures, which depicted Zodiac signs and marine animals, contained
granite stones that mirrored the stones located along the Boston
Harbor.34 In 2003, the defendant, Pembroke Real Estate, moved to
relocate some of Phillips's sculptures off of the park grounds.35 Phillips
sued under VARA claiming the integrity right, arguing that the Eastport
Park itself, including the granite paths and the sea walls of Boston
Harbor near which it is located, is integral to his work.36 The First
Circuit disagreed-to say the least. Rather than simply holding that the
sculpture could be dissembled and removed without violating VARA
rights so long as the integrity of the sculptures themselves were kept
intact, the court went further in holding that no work of site-specific art
is protected under VARA.37
Their reasoning relied on the "public presentation" exception of
VARA, which states that "[t]he modification of a work of visual art
which is the result of conservation, or of the public presentation,
including lighting and placement, of the work is not a destruction,
distortion, mutilation, or other modification. 3 8 The court below had
interpreted this to mean that VARA allows for the removal of the work
from its site, but requires that the work itself be kept intact. 39 There is
evidence that this was in line with Congress's wishes when drafting
VARA, as they noted that "the removal of a work from a specific
location comes within the [presentation] exclusion because the location
is a matter of presentation. ' 4°
But the First Circuit went further. It first acknowledged Phillips's
argument that site itself is integral to site-specific art, helped along by
testimony from a few of those within the art historical community. 41 One
testimony, for example, opined to the court that "[m]uch of modem
sculpture does not exist separate from its context, but rather integrates its
context with the work to form, ideally, a seamless whole. 42 The First
Circuit, applying this logic, deemed it an illogical reading of VARA that
the Act would both protect site-specific art against modification or

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 130.
Id.at 130-31.
Id. at 131.
Id.
Id. at 143.
17 U.S.C. § 106(A)(c)(2) (2006).
See Phillips,459 F.3d at 140.
H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 17 (1990).
See Phillips,459 F.3d at 134.
Id.
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mutilation, yet allow for precisely its modification or mutilation by
divorcing it from its site, which operates as part of the work.43
Needless to say, the reasoning is slightly attenuated, though best
elucidated in this one either-or: "Either VARA recognizes site-specific
art and protects it, or it does not recognize site-specific art at all. '"44 The
court's ultimate decision reflects a deep antagonism to land art's
uncomfortable position between that of traditional art objects, governed
by the law of chattels (movable property), and land, governed by the law
of real property.
American law is already deeply protective of the rights that attach
to any piece of property, including chattel, and VARA has been roundly
criticized for its limitations on what an owner may do with his own
painting-including destroy it, alter it, and paint over it. 45 The First
Circuit's refusal to grant VARA protection to land art, then, shows
judges' reluctance to extend VARA any farther than the traditional
categories of "painting, prints, sculpture, and drawing" that it protects.
Further, both the Phillips and Kelley v. Chicago Park District46 courts,
discussed below, have interpreted these categories as autonomous,
separate mediums, rather than loose categories within which hybrids
may be constructed. 47 Real property-land--on the other hand, presents
graver concerns, as the First Circuit suggests that "owners of nearby
property who had nothing to do with the purchase or installation of
Phillips's works would be subject to claims that what they do with their
property has somehow affected the site and has, as a result, altered or
destroyed Phillips's works."' 8
What Phillips leaves open, then, is whether site-specific art or land
art is copyrightable at all. One possible reading of Phillips suggests that
the court's concern with modification or destruction-and ownership, in
general--could nonetheless qualify land art as an architectural work, for
which "the owners of a building embodying an architectural work may,
without the consent of the author or copyright owner of the architectural
work, make or authorize the making of alterations to such building, and
destroy or authorize the destruction of such building. ' 4 9 This exception
nicely satisfies the First Circuit's concern with property ownership, as
the Act's divorce of building from copyrightable work (in which a

43.

See id.
at 140.

44.
45.

Id.
See Amy M. Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REv. 263,273-77 (2009).

46.
47.

635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011).
Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 300-02 (7th Cir. 2011); Phillips, 459 F.3d at 140.

48.

Phillips, 459 F.3d at 142.

49.

17 U.S.C. § 120 (2006).
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building owned by another may contain a copyrightable architectural
work owned by the artist) would transfer over nicely to the land art
context. Thus, we could analogize the copyrighted architectural work to
the artwork itself, and the building to the site that surrounds it.
Phillips, then, was at least hinting at one viable option for placing
land art more firmly within the architectural medium-for legal
purposes, at least. But, in a more recent case involving land art, the
Seventh Circuit firmly moved in an even more radical directiondeclaring the uncopyrightability of land art, period.5 °
C. Kelley v. Chicago Park District: StrippingLand Art of
All CopyrightProtection
If Phillips presented a question of medium categorization, in which
defining land art as architecture (or, at least, as not-sculpture) may entail
losing certain rights that sculptures are subject to, Kelley, instead,
eschews the issue for the very basics of copyrightability-the ideaexpression
dichotomy
and
the
fixation-in-a-tangible-medium
requirement. 51 The case centered around a wildflower garden created by
the artist Chapman Kelley. 5 2 Wildflower Works consisted of "two
enormous elliptical flowerbeds, each nearly as big as a football field,
featuring a variety of native wildflowers and edged with borders of
gravel and steel. 53 Wildflower Works immediately calls to mind other
"expanded field" artworks like Maya Lin's Wave Fieldat Storm King, a
54
wavy expanse of lush green grass framed by the forest beyond.
Chapman had planted his work in 1984 in the Chicago Park
District, but the condition of the flowerbeds began deteriorating by the
early 2000s. 55 By then, the city decided to modify the garden,
"substantially reducing its size, reconfiguring the oval flowerbeds into
rectangles, and changing some of the planting material. 5 6 Chapman
sued under VARA, claiming that the city had engaged in an
57
unauthorized modification and mutilation of his work.
The Seventh Circuit began by immediately calling into question
whether Wildflower Works can be thought of as a painting or a sculpture
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
at C23.
55.
56.
57.

Kelley, 635 F.3d at 303-07.
Id.at 303.
Id.at 291.
Id.
See Holland Cotter, Where the Ocean Meets the Catskills, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2009,
Kelley, 635 F.3d at 291-92.
Id.at 291.
Id.at 291-92.
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at all-a question of medium. "To qualify for moral-rights protection
under VARA, Wildflower Works cannot just be 'pictorial' or 'sculptural'
in some aspect or effect, it must actually be a 'painting' or a 'sculpture.'
Not metaphorically or by analogy, but really," the court writes.58
Unfortunately, the court never articulates just what about a work makes
it "really" a painting or sculpture, rather than having mere "sculptural"
or "pictorial" qualities. Perhaps, in order to avoid the more vexing issue
of determining just what each medium is, the court moves on to a more
basic (and seemingly simpler) question: whether the work can be
copyrighted at all, as "a living garden lacks the kind of authorship and
stable fixation normally required to support copyright."5 9 The first, the
court maintains, is true because much of Wildflower Works owes its
form to nature-"the colors, shapes, textures, and scents of the plants
originates in nature, not in the mind of the gardener [the derivative term
they have now bestowed upon Chapman]., 60 The second, that the work
is not fixed, is also true, the court opines, because "[a] garden's61
constituent elements are alive and inherently changeable, not fixed."
Because the work is unable to cross even the most basic of all copyright
hurdles-originality and fixation--Chapman does not own a copyright,
let alone moral rights, in the work.
Yet this reasoning is somewhat attenuated, suggesting a deep
discomfort with medium that led the court to address a more
straightforward question about fixation instead. However, the idea that a
living garden lacks fixation would also call into question much of
sculpture made from materials meant to degrade or wear over timeeven man-made ones, like steel. The sculptures of Richard Serra, for
example, are not constant, stable, and unchanging-but are intended to
register the marks and wear of life as the steel ages, changing in color
and texture throughout the years.62 In this sense, even more "traditional"
sculpture is not "fixed" under the court's definition. And ruling out
flowers as merely an "idea" of nature seems silly, to say the least. Plenty
of sculptures depend on natural materials-sand, for example, in the
sculptures of Joseph Beuys-for their existence.63
58.

Id.at 300.

59. ld at 303.
60.
61.

Id. at 304.
Id.

62. Deborah Solomon, Richard Serra: Our Most Notorious Sculptor, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8,
1989, § 6 (Magazine), at 76 ("Cor-Ten steel [the material Serra makes his sculptures from] was
designed to acquire a dark, even patina of rust over time, and this natural process endows Serra's
sculptures with a handsome brown hue. The rust can function metaphorically, too, reminding the
viewer of his own inevitable decay.").
63. Mary and Leigh Block Museum of Art, Joseph Beuys: Sand Drawings, BLOCK
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All of this suggests that what we are really getting at in both these
opinions are basic assumptions about what sculpture-and really, artis.
As I argue in the following Part, judges' natural distrust of land art
owes much to modernism's insistence on purity of art form-meant to
be placed in the museum, free from the every day, and transcendent in
its aspirations. 64
III.

COPYRIGHT IN THE EXPANDED FIELD: WHAT COPYRIGHT LAW
OWES TO MODERNIST MEDIUM SPECIFICITY

I suggested earlier that copyright law, like modernism, focuses on
distilling a medium down to its inherent end logic. 65 Yet, both Phillips
and Kelley seem less guided by what sculpture or painting is, rather than
an almost intuitive, implicit idea of what it is not. And yet, what are both
courts so convinced that art should not be? For this, we turn to another
great modernist critic, Michael Fried, who famously set out to define
what sets "art" apart from mere "objects" in his 1967 essay, Art and
Objecthood.66 For, if this Article had begun by positing that perhaps it is
not just the nineteenth century notion of the romantic author-genius that
copyright law owes its debt to, but its twentieth century avant-garde
successors, a re-reading of Fried's essay garners unexpected parallels
between the rhetoric of the Kelley court and high-modernist mantra.
Fried, in his polemic against minimalist art, termed the works of
well-known minimalist artists-such as Donald Judd, Carl Andre, and
Robert Morris-objects, not artworks.67 Inspired by Greenberg's earlier
rant against minimalism, in which he argued that "[m]inimal works are
readable as art, as almost anything is today-including a door, a table, or
a blank sheet of paper,, 68 Fried takes this new "condition of non-art" and
calls it "objecthood. ' '69 "It is as though objecthood alone can, in the
present circumstances, secure something's identity, if not as nonart, at
least as neitherpainting norsculpture; or as though a work of art-more
accurately, a work of modernist painting or sculpture-were in some

MUSEUM ART, http://www.blockmuseum.northwestem.edu/view/exhibitions/past-exhibits/2012/
joseph-beuys-sand-drawings.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2014).
64. See infra Part MI.
65. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
66. MICHAEL FRIED, Art and Objecthood, in ART AND OBJECTHOOD: ESSAYS AND REVIEWS
148, 152 (1998) [hereinafter FRIED, Art and Objecthood].
67.

MICHAEL FRIED, An Introduction to My Art Criticism, in ART AND OBJECTHOOD: ESSAYS

AND REVIEWS, supra note 66, at 1, 14.
68. 4 CLEMENT GREENBERG, Recentness of Sculpture, in THE COLLECTED ESSAYS AND
CRITICISM: MODERNISM WITH A VENGEANCE, supra note 25, at 250, 253.
69. FRIED, Art and Objecthood, supra note 66, at 152.
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essential respect not an object."7 Here, we see Fried and Greenberg
visibly working to categorize the new sculpture as something other
than--other than painting, other than sculpture, maybe non-art, at best
an object-just as the Kelley court expressed suspicion at granting
VARA protection to something that did not fit neatly into the traditional
category of painting qua painting or sculpture qua sculpture. The court's
categorization of Wildflower Works as merely having "sculptural" or
"painterly" qualities turns what Krauss had termed the expanded
sculpture's negation-as-positive into a negation-as-negative (surely how
Greenberg and Fried would see it): "not-sculpture" or "not-painting"
does not merely expand into a quaternary field of "not-sculpture as
painting" or "not-painting as sculpture.'
Rather, "not-sculpture" or
"not-painting" becomes, simply, not-art.
Yet why is this so? Why is Fried so eager to categorize minimalism
as not-art, as condemned to "objecthood" status? Similarly, how does the
Kelley court come to the conclusion that Wildflower Works, too, is notart, but at best a garden, an ordinary work of landscaping in the middle
of a public park? Surprisingly, we can view the justifications both
provided as one and the same. That is, we can read the Seventh Circuit's
anxiety over the "not fixed," intangible nature of Wildflower Works as
parallel to Fried's distrust of the "endlessness" of minimalist sculpture.
"Endlessness," Fried writes, or the condition of "being able to go
on and on, even having to go on and on, is central both to the concept of
interest and to that of objecthood. ' '72 And so, in many ways, experience
blurs art and life, just as minimalist objects are not self-contained, but
rely on the viewer, on the room, on the atmosphere, and the sounds, air,
and light themselves for their effect. Certainly, Smithson's Spiral Jetty
takes the idea of art as experience, or art-blurred-into-life, to its next
logical progression, as viewers travel along the length of the Jetty one
step at a time in the long journey towards its center. In person, the Jetty
is not viewable in an instant; it cannot be grasped as a whole. And no
two individual's experience of the work will be the same-the Jetty,
whether submerged, re-emerged, laced with rain, or dry from drought, is
inextricably linked with atmosphere, with the time of day, and the
workings of the weather. As such, it, like the works of its minimalist
predecessors that Fried railed against, lacks the "presentness...that one
experiences as a kind of instantaneousness,as though if only one were
infinitely more acute, a single infinitely brief instant would be long

70. Id.(first emphasis added).
71. See KRAUSS, supra note 11, at 282-83.
72. FRIED, Art and Objecthood,supranote 66, at 166.
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enough to see everything, to experience
the work in all its depth and
73
fullness, to be forever convinced by it."
It is this instantaneousness that modernist art aspires toward (as in
the works of Kenneth Noland, Jules Olitski, David Smith, or Anthony
Caro, in which "at every moment the work itself is wholly manifest,"
contends Fried),7 4 and this instantaneousness that minimalist objects
lack. For the latter, "the experience in question persists in time, and the
presentment of endlessness. . . is essentially a presentment of endless or
indefinite duration.75 So we return to the Kelley court's emphasis on
"fixation in a tangible medium," which now manifests itself as an
understanding of art as precisely Fried's modernist notion of
instantaneousness. A work of art, in other words, should not persist in
time, but should be fixed in one moment-a brief instant that captures
the work in all its depth and fullness, in its one-ness and wholeness,
forever. A work of art cannot go on and on, ever-changing, inherently
alive as the flowers in Chapman's work. It is this suspicion of the
intangibility of experience itself that the Kelley court seems to abhor, the
idea that art may expand beyond the object itself to encompass the
conditions of life and time. Somewhere in here we may read the mystic's
hope for immortality, for transcendence. Art should endure even as we
must die. Hence, Fried disdains minimalist art, calling it "literalist"
instead, in what could be a direct evocation of the drabness of life that
art should aim to transcend. 76 "We are all literalists most or all of our
lives," Fried writes.77 But "[p]resentness is grace. 78
IV.

A CREATIVE SOLUTION FOR SITE-SPECIFIC ART:

LOOKING OUTSIDE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

A.

Why Land Art Should Not Be Considered "Architecture"for
CopyrightPurposes

The decisions in Phillips and Kelley, while they have been roundly
criticized by the art law community, seem to reach the most logical
conclusion regarding the vexed relationship between the new expanded
sculpture and moral rights. After all, work that invites modification or
alteration from viewers themselves-in the form of footprints on the
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

167.
166.
166-68.
168.
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Jetty, for example, or a plucked flower from Chapman's Wildflower
Works-cannot then claim the right to be free from modification or
alteration. Similarly, land art's communitarian function suggests at least
some need for a balancing of rights between public interest and artistic
control-both Phillips and Kelley, after all, involved highly public
works in city parks. Like architecture, which serves a public function as
a monument or tourist attraction, it would seem at least reasonable that
the public remain free to photograph large works of land art, even if
protected by copyright. All of which might lead one to suggest: why not
just definitively categorize land art as architecture? We would, hence,
solve both the moral rights problem (as architectural works are not
protected under VARA) and allow for public engagement with these
highly visible works in the form of a pictorial representation exception.79
Moreover, land artists have themselves already acknowledged
the architectural influences in their work, so the analogue seems a
natural one.8 °
And yet, some would argue that the right to control how, for
example, the Jetty appears in photographs and films is as important or
more important than the Jetty itself-after all, most of us only know the
Jetty as a "neatly framed... striking still photographic image that is
endlessly reproduced as the preferred symbol, elegant and concise, for
'earth art.' 81 However, the question in this instance necessarily becomes
case-by-case: a widely-circulated, unauthorized image of the Jetty might
forever tarnish its reputation, but a relatively unknown photograph
published by a tourist on his blog might not affect the Jetty's public
image at all.
I suggest that artists working with the new sculpture in the
expanded field similarly expand their legal remedies beyond that of
copyright law to land art's natural analogue: real property law, and the
doctrines of trespass and nuisance. The former goes straight to the heart
of ownership rights, and the latter to rights of the public.
B.

Trespass as One Form of Creative Control

The doctrine of trespass is probably the more straightforward of the
two. It acknowledges that owners have a "bundle" of rights to their
property, including the right to exclude others from entering and the

79. 17 U.S.C. § 120 (2006).
80. See KRAuss, supra note 11, at 287 (detailing artists' explorations with architecture,
drawing, and site to form hybrid "marked sites," which include art others have termed site-specific
art).

81.

Reynolds, supra note 3, at 73.
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right to place limitations on what one may do upon entering. 82 Using a
mix of property and contract law, then, owners of land art (really, the
owner of the site on which the land art sits, whose interests, oftentimes,
are aligned with those of the artist's-as is the case with the Dia Art
Foundation ("Dia") and de Maria, illustrated in the example below) may
appropriately place conditions on those entering-requiring, for
example, any photography to be solely for personal use, or banning
photography altogether. Such is precisely the method that Dia uses with
de Maria's Lightning Field, which does not permit visitors to simply
drop in, look around, and snap photos. Rather, access to and from
Lightning Fieldis tightly controlled by Dia, which ferries visitors to the
site only upon a two-night stay.8 3 Further, Dia is explicit about retaining
the right to control the way Lightning Field appears in photos.84 This
makes sense for works like de Maria's, as the poles of Lightning Field
undoubtedly look best when struck with lightning and lit up against a
dark night sky. Dia, therefore, does not need a copyright claim to ban
any unauthorized photos of Lightning Field-it can simply assert a
breach of contract action, as every visitor to the site has explicitly agreed
not to publish any such photos.
However, Dia's approach to Lightning Field does not transfer over
as well to, for instance, the Spiral Jetty context, as the sheer mass of it
makes the object visible from the air. Thus, even if Dia could easily limit
what visitors do on the ground, it could not contract with those chance
passersby who spot the Jetty from above and snap a few photos of it.
The same applies to other mass-scale earthworks visible (really only
viewable as whole) from above, like Heizer's Effigy Tumuli-a massive
compilation of earth mounds made to resemble creatures when viewed
from the air.
Furthermore, as noted above, trespass works only when the
interests of the artist and the landowner are perfectly aligned. It should
be every land artist's hope that if he does not himself own the land, then
at least whoever does will act in the best interest of the work, neither
destroying it nor altering it for the worse, and working to ensure that any
unauthorized, unfavorable reproduction in film or photograph is halted.
In a world in which we expect property owners to behave like rational
actors, working diligently to increase and preserve property value, this
should not be an unrealistic expectation. Yet, the current legal troubles
82. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965).

83. Geoff Dyer, Poles Apart, NEW YORKER, Apr. 18, 2011, at 62, 65.
84. Id.
85. Nick Tarasen, Effigy Tumuli, DOUBLE NEGATIVE, http://doublenegative.tarasen.net/
effigytumuli.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2014).
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of the Jetty-the Dia (entrusted with the care of the Jetty after Smithson
passed) failed to renew its lease and has now (at least temporarily) lost
control of the site to the State
of Utah-leaves room to be pessimistic
86
about the future of land art.
In the absence of legal ownership of the land on which the art sits,
artists hoping to preserve a certain degree of control over their works
must look past the simpler gate-keeping methods of trespass and contract
law. My proposal, then, turns to an unlikely source: tort law and
applying the principles of nuisance to the unauthorized aerial
photography/film context.87
C. Nuisance Law: BalancingPublic Interestwith PrivateRight
Nuisance as a real property injury is a relatively new development
in Anglo-American law, dating to the beginning of the twentieth
century.88 Unlike trespass, which is a hard-and-fast rule with bright-line
applicability (any unauthorized trespass upon a land is de facto

wrongful), 89 nuisance is a balancing test conducted by judges that
weighs the competing interests of both parties. 90 And, unlike trespass, no
physical intrusion is necessary; intangible intrusions, like dust particles,
light, air, and noise, can constitute an actionable invasion. 91 Courts have
defined a nuisance as "anything which interferes with the rights of a
citizen, either in person, property, the enjoyment of his property, or his
comfort ....A condition is a nuisance when it clearly appears that

86. Glen Warchol, Control of Iconic Sculpture Spiral Jetty in Dispute, SALT LAKE
TRIBuNE (June 9, 2011, 9:58 AM), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/news/51970092-78/dia-jetty-leasespiral.html.csp.
87. This Article focuses on the reproduction and distribution rights of copyright because these
are the two rights land artists will be most concerned with. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3) (2006).
Consider the other exclusive rights a land artist could assert if he held a copyright: the right to
prepare derivative works and the right to display his work. However, land art's invitation to the
public to interact with the artwork renders a prohibition on derivative works impractical and, likely,
directly inapposite to the artist's intentions, while the work's immovable state means that it can only
be displayed in the one place it was built-the intended site.
88. See Hendricks v. Stalnaker, 380 S.E.2d 198, 200-01 (W. Va. 1989) (discussing early cases
dating from the late-1800s through the mid-1900s that applied nuisance law).
89. See Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 159 (Wis. 1997) (awarding
punitive damages in the absence of actual harm due to "the loss of the individual's right to exclude
others from his or her property").
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (1979) (noting that "the gravity of the harm"
must "outweigh[] the utility of the actor's conduct" to be considered a nuisance).
91. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 871 (N.Y. 1970) (finding that
dirt, smoke, and vibration emanating from a nearby plant is actionable as nuisance); Medford v.
Levy, 8 S.E. 302, 303-06, 308 (W. Va. 1888) (classifying cooking odors as nuisance); St. Helen's
Smelting Co. v. Tipping, (1865) 11 Eng. Rep. 1483, 1483, 1486, 1488 (H.L.) (finding that noxious
vapors constitute a nuisance).
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enjoyment of property is materially lessened., 92 Courts will balance the
landowner's interest in the enjoyment of his property with the social
value of the activity alleged to cause the harm. 93
Activities such as air pollution emitting from a nearby factory onto
homeowners' land, and noxious gas issuing from a smelting plant that
substantially damaged plaintiffs' hedges and shrubs, have been
enjoined. 94 Further, the plaintiff is entitled to monetary damages
stemming from "the depreciation in the market value of the property
injured" (a "diminution of the value" standard).9 5 I argue, then, that a
nuisance cause of action is just as apt in the land art context, where
publication of photographs or films that misrepresent, distort, or
otherwise present works like the Jetty unfavorably--detracting from
their overall appeal-can cause irreparable damage to the value of the
artworks themselves, and, therefore, such publication constitutes a
nuisance that must be enjoined.
While almost all nuisance cases to date have balanced a
homeowner's right to the enjoyment of his property against another
party's right to carry on some arguably harmful activity, a land art
owner's right to the enjoyment of his property is fundamentally different
from that of a resident. Specifically, the value of his property lies in its
public presentation,and it is mostly through the dissemination and mass
circulation of images or film that favorable public regard is garnered to a
remote work of land art otherwise only accessible via pilgrimage. The
owner of a work of land art, unlike a homeowner, does not derive
enjoyment from living peaceably on the property-which, in the case of
homeowners, provided justifications for categorizing noise, pollution,
and noxious gases as nuisances. Rather, land art owners derive
enjoyment solely from the good reputation (translating directly to higher
market value) the work enjoys. 96 For the same reasons that a loud plant
operation must be enjoined if it interferes with a homeowner's right to
quiet enjoyment, the mass-scale circulation of unfavorable, unauthorized
photographs must be prohibited to prevent the depreciation in value of
the art owner's property.
92. Hendricks, 380 S.E.2d at 200 (emphasis added).
93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826, cmts. a, c (1979).
94. See Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 871; St. Helen's Smelting Co., 11 Eng. Rep. at 1483.
95. J. E. Keefe, Jr., Annotation, Damagesfor Diminution of Value of Use of the Propertyas
Recoverablefor a PermanentNuisanceAffecting Real Property, 10 A.L.R.2d 669, 669-70 (1950).
96. There has been much literature written on the effect an artist's reputation has on the value
(translated via market price) of his work. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors'
and Artists' Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95,
104-05 (1997); Gladys Engel Lang & Kurt Lang, Recognition and Renown: The Survival of Artistic
Reputation, 94 AM. J. SOC, 79, 105 (1988); Tang, The Artist as Brand,supra note 10, at 234-35.
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Using nuisance in lieu of copyright essentially weighs the same
balancing interests that the latter already takes into account. That is,
copyright is not an absolute monopoly. The fair use doctrine, which
allows the appropriation of a copyrighted work in limited instances, is,
like nuisance law, a balancing test that weighs the interest of the
copyright holder against the interest of the defendant.97 The four-factor
fair use test weighs the purpose and character of the infringing use
(whether it is transformative-that is, adding "new aesthetics, new
insights and understandings" to the original work)98 with the nature of
the copyrighted work (fictional works get more copyright protection
than nonfictional works), 99 the amount of the work taken, and the effect
of the infringing use on the market or value of the copyrighted work. 100
A nuisance balancing test applied in the art context would take
much of the same considerations into play. Specifically, the
"nuisance"-an unauthorized representation in the form of a photo or
film-must be harmful in some way, and, as in fair use, severely affect
the market or value of the work (the "diminution of value" standard)
without adding any tangible benefits or transformative value. Such a
requirement recognizes that there is a broad public interest in art that
copyright law itself acknowledges and serves-the public interest in
being enriched, in appropriating knowledge, and in building off of the
works of others in order to create more works. By balancing the rights of
the real property owner and the social value of the activity said to
constitute a nuisance, nuisance law strangely mimics fair use's balancing
test of the rights of the copyright holder against the social value of the
new, infringing work.
We can also see this concern with balancing public good and
private rights in the unfavorable treatment Kelley and Phillips accorded
site-specific art. Underlying both courts' reluctance to allow the artists
complete control of these works, installed and displayed on public
grounds, could be the fact that these works were precisely that-public
art, sponsored and owned by the city, and created with public funds. If
copyright law was already deeply concerned with the appropriate
balancing of a right holder's monopoly power and the public interest in
art's progress (specifically, the Constitution's Copyright Clause allows
Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of Science [broadly meaning
knowledge] ...by securing for limited Times to Authors... the

97. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
98. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a FairUse Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990).
99. See American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 925 (2d Cir. 1994).
100. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
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exclusive Right to their. . . Writings"),1 ' then allowing one artist to
prohibit the public from either touching a sculpture or taking a
photograph as a keepsake seems to take the right too far. Land art, in
bringing art out of the sacred space of the museum and into life, should
likewise welcome the contingencies and human interaction,
modification, recreation, or personal memorialization that life thrusts
upon it.

At last, it may seem obvious but nonetheless bears pointing out that
the doctrine of nuisance, unlike fair use, does not require that the new
use be valuable at all. We might analogize nuisance law's requirement
that any interference with an owner's property be substantial to the
doctrine of de minimis use in copyright law. That is, trivial uses (like
reproducing an image to hang on one's refrigerator) 10 2 are not
considered copyright infringement. 0 3 Likewise, images taken of the
Jetty from a personal trip and posted on one's travel blog, for example,
are likely so de minimis as to constitute a non-nuisance. In that instance,
an artist cannot argue that such a reproduction has materially interfered
with his rights in his work.
V.

CONCLUSION

Some great works of land art will no doubt become as iconic as the
natural wonders that draw visitors from around the world each year.
Smithson's man-made Jetty could, thus, easily rival the Grand Canyon in
the years to come. But the future of the Jetty-including its status as a
copyrightable artwork-is hard to predict.
The continued development of these works in the expanded field
must similarly expand beyond the modernism-inflected, mediumspecific, and self-contained ethos of copyright law. To be like life, to be
in the everyday, and to expand the realm of possibility, the new
sculpture must necessarily appropriate legal remedies once thought of as
more fitting for homeowners than for artists; for real, grounded property
rather than for intellectual property. Similarly, courts should remain
open to these untraditional remedies as one way of addressing the nonfixed, land/art hybrid of the new expanded medium.' °4 These remedies,
of course, are imperfect: as with Chapman's Wildflower Works and
Phillips's stoneworks, the artwork owner's interests may be opposed to
the artist's interests, and, in many best-case scenarios, artists must rely
101.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8.

102. Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d. Cir. 1997).
103. Id.
104. See supra Part IV.
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on property owners with aligned interests, like Dia, for the conservation
and preservation of artworks.' 0 5 But, then again, life itself, which
earthworks take as their base, is imperfect. The desire for absolute
control over a work of one's own, like the desire to leave one's marketched in larger-scale format, permanent for now, and hopefully for all
time-on the world, is a natural, albeit megalomaniacal, human urge.
Land art's inevitable impermanence lends it mortality's tragedy, as it
does a strange sense of otherworldly potency and urgency. See the
Jetty today, lest it disappear tomorrow. And when it does, the
photograph will keep it in place-memorialize it as it was meant to be
seen-only better.

105. See supra Parts H-rn.
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